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 PREFERENCES OVER SOLUTIONS
 TO THE BARGAINING PROBLEM
 BY KIM C. BORDER AND UZI SEGAL1
 There are several solutions to the Nash bargaining problem in the literature. Since
 various authors have expressed preferences for one solution over another, we find it
 useful to study preferences over solutions in their own right. We identify a set of
 appealing axioms on such preferences that lead to unanimity in the choice of solution,
 which turns out to be the solution of Nash.
 KEYwORDS: Nash bargaining solution, quadratic utility functions.
 1. INTRODUCTION
 IN THE NASH (1950, 1953) APPROACH to bargaining, a bargaining game is
 described by a pair (S, d) where SC R2 is compact and convex and d E S.
 Elements of S are interpreted as vectors of the von Neumann-Morgenstern
 utilities of the two players. The point d is the disagreement point, that is, a
 vector of utilities that either player can unilaterally enforce. A solution is a
 function f that assigns to each game (S, d) a point in S. Of course many
 solutions are possible, but Nash proposed internal consistency conditions on the
 values of a solution across different games. The only solution to satisfy his
 axioms is called the Nash bargaining solution, and is defined by f(S, d)=
 argmaxx 4E S, x> d (X1 - dl)(X2 - d2).
 Other notions of consistency can be imposed on a solution. Kalai and
 Smorodinskv (1975), for example, offered another set of axioms, with another
 notion of internal consistency, and got a different solution. It is therefore
 natural to ask, given that different notions of consistency exist, which is a better
 solution. We assume that there exist preferences over solutions satisfying certain
 sets of axioms and explore whether they admit a maximal element, and if so,
 what it is.
 The preferences over solutions and the assumptions we make on them can be
 interpreted in more than one way. One interpretation is that the two bargainers
 hire an arbitrator to make choices for them. The arbitrator has a preference
 order over solutions that embodies his own notions of fairness. These prefer-
 ences are similar to the social preferences discussed in the social choice
 literature (e.g., Harsanyi (1955)), but they differ in that they are over solution
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 2 K. C. BORDER AND U. SEGAL
 concepts, rather than over final allocations. In other words, the arbitrator must
 come up with a decision rule that will apply to all possible games, and not to just
 one set of possible utility portfolios.
 Of course, the bargainers have to agree to arbitration. We can therefore
 interpret our axioms on preferences as properties that both bargainers can
 accept in an arbitrator, subject to the constraint that both must agree to hire
 one. For instance, while my coauthor's preferences over solutions are simply to
 maximize his own payoff, and my preferences are to maximize mine, we both
 know that neither will agree to impose such a requirement on an arbitrator. Our
 aim is therefore to propose axioms that both bargainers can accept. Arguably, it
 will be easier for them to agree on a set of axioms as guidelines for the
 arbitrator than to agree on the allocation for each game.
 One important feature of the bargaining game is the existence of a disagree-
 ment point, namely a point each player can impose by refusing to play the game.
 It is claimed in the social choice literature that lack of ex post fairness can be
 compensated by ex ante choice of procedures like randomization (see Diamond
 (1967) and Epstein and Segal (1992)). In the bargaining problem, restricting
 attention to ex ante fairness may not be enough. The arbitrator, and the
 bargainers instructing him, will have to make sure that the ex post result is not
 too unfair, at least to the extent that whatever game is to be played, each player
 must receive at least his disagreement level of utility. The need for ex post and
 ex ante fairness of procedures stands behind our two major axioms.
 Our axioms imply that the Nash solution is the best, and we give a full
 description of all preference relations satisfying this set. These results are
 presented in Section 2. We discuss some aspects of the literature in Section 3
 and conclude with an analysis of some possible objections in Section 4. The
 theorems are proved in the appendices.
 2. THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION
 For our purposes, a two-person bargaining game is represented by a compact
 and convex subset S of 2+ such that S is disposable, that is, [x e S and
 x _y] y e S. (We use the following orders on vectors. x _y means xi ?yi for
 all i, and x ?y means xi >yi for all i). Each point x = (x1, x2) E S corresponds
 to an allocation of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities for the two players in
 which player 1 receives x1 and player 2 receives x2. In order to make our
 analysis more accessible, we assume throughout that the disagreement point is
 (O,O).2
 Let V denote the set of all games that are included in [0, K] x [0, K] c IR+
 and contain the point (K, K). All we require is that K > 0, but it may be as close
 to zero as one wishes. A solution is a function f: - 124 satisfying f(S) e S for
 every S EE S. This definition and the assumption that the disagreement point is
 2In the standard bargaining problem this point is not fixed, but our analysis can be extended to
 include this case (see the end of this section).
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 (0, 0) rule out the possibility that a solution will ever assign any of the players an
 outcome that is worse than his disagreement level. As mentioned in the
 introduction, we are looking for a mechanism that will capture both ex ante and
 ex post notions of fairness. Although one may argue for the ex ante fairness of a
 solution that benefits each player in some games at the cost of giving his
 opponent less than his disagreement level, such allocations are hardly fair ex
 post, and probably will be hard to enforce. We discuss this requirement further
 below.
 The space W of games is endowed with the Hausdorff metric, given by
 p(S, T) = max sup d(x, T), sup (x, S)
 X E=S x e T
 = inf{e> 0: S cN(T) and TcN,(S)),
 where d(x, T) = infye TIIx -yII and N,k(T) ={x e R: d(x, T) < e}. Given this
 metric, the space W is compact.3
 Since games are convex and disposable, the outer boundary determines the
 distance between two games. If each point on the boundary of S is within e
 neighborhood of a boundary point of T and vice-versa, then the Hausdorff
 distance between S and T is no more than s, and conversely.
 We assume throughout that solutions are continuous in the Hausdorff metric,
 that is, that each solution is a continuous function from W to R2 . Both Nash's
 (1950) and Kalai-Smorodinsky's (1975) solutions satisfy this requirement. Let 9
 denote the set of continuous solutions. Then 9 is a metric space under the
 metric
 d(f, g) = sup 11 f(S) - g(S)II.
 S ew
 This metric defines the topology of uniform convergence of solutions on W, and
 Y is separable (see Lemma 3.72 in Aliprantis and Border (1994)).
 Two solutions can be mixed as follows. For f, g eY and a e [0,1], the
 solution af + (1 - a)g assigns game S eW the outcome af(S) + (1 - a)g(S).
 All games S are assumed to be convex so this mixture is well defined. Since
 points in S are interpreted as vectors of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
 levels, one can interpret the solution of + (1 - a)g as a lottery that yields the
 solution f with probability a and the solution g with probability 1 - a. This is
 because ex ante, each player's utility is the same under the mixed solution and
 under the lottery.
 On - we assume the existence of a quasiorder a, that is, >, is reflexive,
 total, and transitive. Consider the following assumptions.
 3This is because the space -% of compact convex subsets of [0, K] X [0, K] is a compact metric
 space under the Hausdorff metric (see Theorem 5.43 in Aliprantis and Border (1994)), and it is
 straightforward to show that W is a closed subset of Z. Incidentally, this is why we need the
 assumption that all games in W contain the point (K, K). The set of games for which there only exists
 some strictly positive point is a-compact, but not compact, which creates problems later.
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 ASSUMPrION C (Continuity): a is a closed subset of JrX Y
 ASSUMPTION M (Monotonicity): If f(S) _ g(S) for all S e 9 and f(T) >> g(T)
 for some T, then f >- g.
 ASSUMPTION DI (Disagreement Indifference): If for all S e , either f1(S) = 0
 or f2(S) = 0 (or both), then f 0 (O is the solution that always gives both players
 zero).
 ASSUMPTION MS (Mixture Symmetry): f g implies that for each a E [0, 1],
 af+(1 -a)g-ag+(1 -a)f.4
 The continuity assumption is on the preference relation >a, and is different
 from the assumption that each of the solutions is a continuous function.
 Regarding monotonicity, note that if f(T) > g(T), then continuity of solutions
 guarantees that f >>g on an open set of games. Also note that condition DI
 does not require that it is always the same player who receives zero. This
 condition may be rationalized on the following grounds.
 One important feature of the bargaining problem is that each player can
 enforce a minimum utility level for himself through the disagreement point. An
 arbitrator and the bargainers will have to take this into consideration. In social
 choice theory, a social planner can satisfy his concerns for fairness by ensuring
 ex ante equality, for example, by flipping a coin between members of society
 over who will go to war (see Diamond (1967) and Epstein and Segal (1992)). In
 bargaining, a solution must display some concern also for ex post fairness,
 otherwise it may be unacceptable by at least one of the players. So a good
 solution to the bargaining game must not be too inequitable. This requirement
 is behind the disagreement indifference assumption.
 The arbitrator and the players do not know whether the latter are going to
 abide by the solution in any given game S. Clearly, the closer to zero a
 bargainer's utility is under a solution (when better outcomes are possible), the
 more likely he is to deviate from the solution. This probability becomes a virtual
 certainty when his outcome is zero. This is because in that case he has no
 incentive at all to play and may as well "punish" the other player. Thus any
 attempt to use a solution satisfying the hypotheses of condition DI is tanta-
 mount to using the zero solution.
 There are of course situations where it must always be the case that ex post
 one player wins nothing (see Diamond (1967)). In such situations it is indeed
 impossible to assume that players have enough power to impose a bad outcome
 on everyone. It is precisely this extra strength each player has that will convince
 the arbitrator (or the bargainers) to avoid solutions where whatever the game is,
 someone will not mind blocking the outcome.
 4Chew, Epstein, and Segal (1991) refer to this property as strong mixture symmetry. However,
 they show that it is equivalent to what they call mixture symmetry, so we adopt this definition.
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 But is it not true that letting each player win everything in some games is
 better than letting the same player win everything in all these games? Ex ante,
 the answer is of course yes. But if ex post both solutions will result in both
 players receiving zero, the answer is no.
 If we interpret the axioms as characteristics of the arbitrator that both
 bargainers can accept, then player i's true preferences over solutions need not
 satisfy disagreement indifference. Rather, the axiom represents his consent to
 the fact that he cannot impose his preferences on his opponent. This justifica-
 tion is somewhat similar in spirit to Binmore's (1991, Section 3.3) argument that
 players are constrained only by natural law, but not by ethical conventions. The
 reason a player agrees to disagreement indifference is not because of empathy
 with the other player, but because of his own self-interest, fearing a zero
 outcome for himself. Also note that delegating authority to an arbitrator
 requires both players to agree on some ground rules, which by their nature
 ought to treat both bargainers symmetrically. Disagreement indifference satis-
 fies this requirement.
 The rationale for the MS condition is the same as the one used in social
 choice theory (see Epstein and Segal (1992)).5 Recall that af + (1-a)g is
 equivalent, ex ante, to the lottery that yields the solution f with probability a
 and the solution g with probability 1 - a. So we have to justify why if f g, the
 lotteries over solutions (f, a; g, 1 - a) and (f, 1 - a; g, a) are equally attractive.
 The disagreement indifference and continuity assumptions imply that both
 players' claims must get some consideration. When such conflicting considera-
 tions balance each other, indifference between f and g will follow. A mathe-
 matically equivalent version of the mixture symmetry axiom (together with weak
 quasiconcavity) says that if f - g, then the 2 - 2 lottery over the two solutions is
 not worse than any other possible lottery over them (see Lemma A1.2 (b) in
 Chew, Epstein, and Segal (1991)). If an arbitrator does not want to appear to be
 in favor of one of the two bargainers, such indifference will force the even
 chance lottery over the two solutions not to be inferior to any other possible
 lottery over them. Mixture symmetry thus follows.
 If the axioms represent a common set of rules on which bargainers instructing
 an arbitrator can agree, then mixture symmetry becomes even more attractive.
 Suppose the arbitrator is going to be indifferent between two solutions because
 of conflicting claims by the bargainers. Then unless they want to work out such
 conflicts by themselves (which they probably wish not to do, since they hired an
 arbitrator), an even chance lottery over the two solutions seems the easiest
 compromise to reach.
 5The mixture symmetry axiom is a weaker version of the independence axiom (f a g - af + (1-
 O)h a ag + (1 - a)h Va E (0,11 and Vh E.g), so any arguments in favor of the independence axiom
 in social choice (see Harsanyi (1955)) also apply here. Mixture symmetry has the advantage that it
 allows for preferences that some choices be made according to chance (e.g., draft lotteries).
 However, it is also consistent with the betweenness assumption, namely that f g = f af + (1 -
 a)g for all aE[0,1].
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 THEOREM 1: If a satisfies conditions C, M, DI, and MS, then there is a
 measure ji on W with fiull support (that is, every open set in W has a positive
 measure), such that the function
 V(f) = f (S)f2(S) dt(S)
 represents a on R
 That is, solutions in 9 are ranked on a weighted average of the "Nash social
 welfare function," w(x) = x1x2. This result immediately implies the next theo-
 rem.
 THEOREM 2: If a satisfies conditions C, M, DI, and MS, then the Nash
 bargaining solution is the unique a -best solution in 9
 The formal proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix A, but we shall explain the
 roles of the hypotheses here. We first pick one game, denoted T1. For each
 x = (x1, x2) e T1 we define a solution6 fX E- such that fx(T1) =x, and such
 that if xi = 0, then for all S, f1X(S) = 0. The isomorphism x fX is continuous
 and monotonic, in the sense that x ? y implies for all S, fX(S) >> fY(S), and
 satisfies fax'+(l-a)Y(S) = afx(S) + (1 - a)fY(S). The order a thus induces a
 continuous and monotonic order > on T1, satisfying mixture symmetry. The
 following fact is implied by Theorem 6 and Appendix 2 in Chew, Epstein, and
 Segal (1991), and by Chew, Epstein, and Segal (1994).
 FACT 1: Let a on a compact and convex subset D C ltn satisfy continuity,
 monotonicity, and mixture symmetry, and let V represent a. Then D can be
 partitioned into three convex regions A, B, and C, so that V is quadratic and
 quasiconcave on A, quadratic and quasiconvex on C, and satisfies betweenness on
 B. Furthernore, A , B , C.
 Disagreement indifference rules out regions B and C, although this can be
 done by using much weaker assumptions. Next we extend the above construction
 to n games. Given T1,..., Tn e , we define for x = (x1,.. ., x") E HITi a solution
 fX such that fx(T1) = xi, and show that it satisfies the above requirements. Once
 again the induced order on HlTi can be represented by a quadratic function.
 This quadratic function may however contain expressions of the form xkx1,
 i, j E {1 ... ., n}, k, 1 E {1, 2}, i #j, k * 1. By taking a dense sequence of games {Tj)
 in W, we generate a unique limiting measure X on V x ' such that a can be
 represented by flx f1(S)f2(T) dir(S, T).
 Disagreement indifference now implies that 1T must be supported by the
 diagonal A = {(S, S): S E '} of ' x S. Otherwise, let G1 x G2 cV .x. be an
 6In the Appendix, this solution is denoted T,,x-
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 open region such that A n (G1 x G2) = 0 and iT(G1 X G2) > 0. Construct a
 solution f such that fi(S) = 0 iff S _ Gi. Then by disagreement indifference,
 f 0 o, but Jfvxf1(S)f2(T) dlr(S, T) # 0.
 The full support of ,tt is guaranteed by the monotonicity condition. Otherwise,
 improving a solution on a zero measure set will not change the attractiveness of
 the solution, violating monotonicity. The compactness of the space V is crucial
 to showing that a limiting measure exists, which is one reason we assume that
 (K, K) belongs to all games. Of course, once we have the utility representation,
 since the Nash bargaining solution maximizes the integrand at each point, it is
 the best solution.
 The above analysis can be extended to the case where the disagreement point
 d is not fixed. Solutions are then defined over pairs (S, d), where x E S x ? d.
 These solutions are assumed to be continuous with respect to the second
 variable, while condition DI is modified as follows. If for all (S, d), either
 f1(S) = d1 or f2(S) = d2, then f-fb, where fb(S, d) = d for all (S, d). The
 rationale for this axiom and for the requirement that all points in S yield both
 players at least as much utility as d is the same as the one offered for the
 original DI condition. Once they know what game S is being played, each player
 can block any outcome that does not yield him at least his disagreement utility
 level. Moreover, if he receives this utility level, he might as well force the
 minimal outcome on his opponent. The representation theorem now defines a
 measure over the set of pairs (S, d) with the integrand (fi(S) - dl)(f2(S) - d2),
 and its proof is similar to the one outlined above. The major differences are that
 the isomorphism f X will be defined taking d into consideration, and the
 sequence {Ti} of games will be dense with respect to both S and d.
 3. SOME REMARKS ON THE LITERATURE
 Recently, Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson (1992) analyzed the bargaining
 problem in light of the recent non-expected utility literature and presented an
 alternative model and axioms. They start with a certain set A of (physical)
 alternatives and a point D. Each of the two players has preferences over
 lotteries over elements of A. Given the utility functions ul and u2 of the two
 players, points in A, and the point D, are transformed into points in 2.
 Formally, d(u1, U2; D) = (ul(D), u2(D)) and S(u1, u2; A) = {(u1(a), u2(a)): a E
 Al. The authors point out that there are two possible interpretations of the
 bargaining model.
 According to the first, the set A and the point D are fixed, say A =A* and
 D = D*. The bargaining problem is to decide what point in S(u1, u2; A*) to
 choose for each pair of utilities (u1, u2), given that the disagreement point is
 7Otherwise, it might turn out that the utility of a solution f is determined by limits of values of
 f(S) as S decreases to {(O, 0)}. There are of course other assumptions that could be used to rule out
 this implausible sort of preference order, but we feel our choice is as good as any other.
 8Note that (x1 - d1xX2 - d2) is monotonic only where x ? d.
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 d(u1, U2; D*). If f is a solution to that problem, then a physical outcome of the
 solution is a point a in A* such that (u (a), u2(a)) =f(S(u1, u2; A*)).
 Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson use this interpretation. Note that if ul and u2
 are von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, then the invariance with re-
 spect to utility transformations axiom is almost trivial-the outcome (in A*)
 should depend on preferences, and not on the particular choice of a utility
 function.
 In this paper we adopt an alternative approach which holds the players (with
 their preferences and utility functions) fixed, and lets the set A vary (we
 assumed a fixed point of disagreement). Formally, let u* and u* be two given
 von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. What rule should be used to
 determine how much utility each of the two players will get for different sets A?
 This representation of the problem fits better into a social choice context. Note
 that Nash's axiom of invariance with respect to utility transformations does not
 fit into this interpretation, because it analyzes rescaling of the utility functions,
 which in this approach are assumed to be fixed. Such rescaling is possible, but
 leads to much weaker results. Suppose that instead of the utility function ui,
 player i uses the utility function ajui. Then for each set A we get a new set of
 corresponding utility vectors. Formally, it defines an isomorphism &' ,
 where for S et S - Sa = {(ax1 a2x2) (xax2) eS It is natural to require
 that possible solutions be transformed in the same way. Formally, i ?,
 where fa(Sa) = (alf1(S), a2f2(S)). Unlike Nash's axiom, this is a transformation
 of solutions (which are functions), and not of the value of a solution for a given
 game. All it says is that the choice of points from the (different) sets A should
 depend on the players' preferences, and not on the chosen utility functions. A
 similar argument also implies that one should not assume symmetry. A symmet-
 ric set S depends on a specific choice of utility functions by the players and does
 not necessarily represent a true symmetric situation (see also Rubinstein, Safra,
 and Thomson (1992)).
 A related analysis is offered by van Damme (1986). In his model players can
 choose a solution concept, and then bargain with their opponent, provided they
 adhere to their (perhaps different) solutions. Making some restrictions on the
 set of solutions players may adopt, he proves that the Nash solution constitutes
 the unique equilibrium of the game induced by this procedure. In his approach,
 the Nash solution is the outcome of strategic behavior, and not necessarily a
 preferred solution. We, on the other hand, are interested in solutions that are
 reached by agreement, and are preferred (by the players or by an arbitrator) to
 other solutions.
 4. SOME POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS
 One motivation for this paper is the fact that the solutions of both Nash and
 Kalai-Smorodinsky have a lot of appeal. Unfortunately, the two systems of
 axioms leading to these solutions are inconsistent. It is therefore natural to have
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 preferences over such systems, and therefore over solutions. One might argue,
 however, that we replaced systems of axioms about solutions by systems of
 axioms on preferences over solutions. And since other such systems are possible,
 we may once again face the same problem, namely, which do we prefer.
 If we accept the interpretation that a is the preference relation an arbitrator
 has over solutions, then this objection is faulty. Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky
 axiomatize the notion of consistency of a solution. Clearly, both offer reasonable
 definitions of consistency, and one may like both. We, on the other hand,
 axiomatize individual (i.e., the arbitrator's) preferences over solutions. Standard
 models of consumer theory argue that each agent has one preference relation
 which is part of his characteristics, and is not an element of choice. A person
 may therefore prefer the axioms of Nash to those of Kalai-Smorodinsky, but it is
 meaningless for him to prefer the axioms of Section 2 to another set of axioms
 over his preferences.
 This objection is however valid if one adopts the interpretation that our
 axioms are rules the players agree to impose on the arbitrator, where one may
 object to the merit of such an approach on the ground that we replace the
 requirement that players agree on what is a consistent solution (that is, axioms
 a-la-Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky) with a requirement that the players agree on
 axioms ranking solutions. This is true, but even with this interpretation we
 believe our axioms to be better for two reasons. One is that (as mentioned
 above), in the context of fixed players and a variable set A, some of Nash's (and
 Kalai-Smorodinsky's) axioms lose their appeal. Another difference is that we
 allow players a lot more flexibility in deciding what parts of the problem they
 find relevant. Nash's IIA axiom holds for all games S c T, regardless of whether
 a player perceives some of them to be more likely to be played than others, or
 more important for him because of their form. In our approach, players do not
 have to agree on the relative importance of different games. As is reflected by
 Theorem 1, our axioms permit a lot of disagreement between the bargainers,
 even though enough agreement is built into the model to ensure that Nash's is
 the best solution.
 Another possible objection argues that instead of agreeing on axioms over
 preference over solutions, the bargainers can try to solve a simpler problem.
 Even though they do not know now what game they will play, they can agree on
 (axioms about) a preference relation over possible allocations in the game they
 will play. Indeed, all our axioms can be easily applied to sets. For example,
 mixture symmetry will require that if two allocations x, y E S are indifferent to
 each other, then for all a E [0,1], ax + (1 - a)y - (1 - a)x + ay. Disagree-
 ment indifference will require that the set {x: x1x2 = 0} be an indifference set.
 The optimality of the Nash solution will then follow.
 Although this approach is technically correct, we find it less convincing than
 ours. One reason a bargainer is willing to take his opponent into consideration
 is that he may ex ante compensate himself for an unfavorable outcome in one
 game by a good outcome in another. Once we agree that the induced prefer-
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 ences on a particular game depend on outcomes in other potential games,
 solutions, rather than outcomes, should be the correct object of preferences and
 choice.
 In Section 2 we rationalized the mixture symmetry axiom by claiming that
 indifference between solution f, which is more favorable to one bargainer, and
 g, which is more favorable to the other, suggests the half-half point as the best
 mixture of the two. But there are situations where two solutions may be
 indifferent where no conflict between the bargainers is involved. Suppose
 f2(S) = g2(S) for all S e S. So from the second player's selfish point of view it
 makes no difference whether f or g is chosen. Suppose further that player 1 too
 is indifferent between f and g, presumably because he deems f better for some
 games, and g for others. Why should the arbitrator now prefer zf + 2g to either
 f or g? In fact, since player 1 is using a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility, and
 since no issue of fairness is involved, the arbitrator should be indifferent
 between f and af + (1 - a)g, for all a E [0,1].
 We agree. Indeed, this is exactly what is implied by the representation
 function of Theorem 1. Let h(S) =f2(S) = g2(S). Then f g implies
 ffi(S)h(S) dpX(S) = f gl(S)h(S) d,A(S)
 - ffi(S)h(S) dI(S)
 = f [taf(S) + (1 - a)g1(S)]h(S)dpu(S).
 There is one problem to which we do not have a simple answer. Our analysis
 depends strongly on the fact that there are only two players. The Nash solution
 for the n-person bargaining game involves an n-dimensional polynomial
 (maxx e S H(xi - di)), while mixture symmetry is associated with quadratic func-
 tions. We offer another set of axioms that can deal with any number of players
 in Border and Segal (1995).
 Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Califromia Institute of Technol-
 ogy, Pasadena CA 91125, U.S.A.
 and
 Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario, London N6A 5C2,
 Canada.
 Manuscript received April, 1995; final revision received March, 1996.
 APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
 The proof of Theorem 1 is divided into numerous lemmas. Given T e .V, for S e V define
 aT(S) = max{A: AT c S}. That is, aT(S)T is the largest multiple of T that fits in S. In particular,
 aT(T) = 1. Also note that if S, Tn ES., then (K/K) < aT(S) ? (K/K). The mapping S - aT(S) is
 continuous for any T.
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 SOLUTIONS TO THE BARGAINING PROBLEM 11
 We now temporarily fix T and for each x E T we construct a solution PT x by
 OT,X(S) = aT(S)X.
 By definition, aT(S)X E S, so 'T,x is truly a solution. Furthermore, observe that (PT, X(T) = x.
 LEMMA 1: For every S, T E -' and for every x E T, the solution (PT x satisfies
 K
 (1) lix- TT x(S)ll < 4-p(S, T).
 K
 The proof of this lemma is a tedious exercise in elementary geometry, so we defer it to Appen-
 dix B.
 The above construction induces an isomorphism between T and a subset of solutions.
 LEMMA 2: The isomorphism x PT,x from T into is continuous and one-to-one. It preserves
 mixtures in the sense that (PT, Ax+(1 - A)y = A(?T x + (1 - A)'PT, Y, and is monotonic (that is, if x >>y,
 then '(PT x(S) > PT, y(S) for all S). Finally, if xl = 0, then 'PT x gives player i the outcome 0 for all S.
 PROOF: Continuity follows from continuity of aT(S). Mixture preservation follows from
 (A'PT,X + (1 - A)4PT,y)(S) = A(PT,X(S) + (1 - A)PT,Y(S)
 = AaT(S)x + (1 - A)aT(S)Y
 = aT(S)(Ax + (1 - A)y)
 = (PT, Ax+ (1-A)y(S)
 The other claims are obvious. Q.E.D.
 Our aim is to approximate arbitrary solutions by convex combinations of solutions of this form. In
 order to do this, we need a partition of unity with some special properties. So given n, let
 Qn = {z E f : at most one zi = 0}, and define An = (A n ..., An): Qn `RF n by
 if each z} > 0,
 zn)=ti 1 if Zif=0,
 t0 if zj = 0 for some j i.
 Observe that An is continuous on Qn and is a partition of unity, that is, E= 1Al(z) = 1 for each
 Z e Qn,-
 We now define the convex combinations. Given a vector T of distinct games T= (T...Tn) and
 a vector x of points x = (x1, xn) with xi E Ti for each i, define the solution (PT, x by
 n
 T,x(s) = ; Ai( p(S, T1), p(S Tn))'PT,,x,(S)
 i=lI
 Observe that PT, x is continuous, 'TT x(S) e S for each S, and PT, x(S) = Xi whenever S = Ti.
 Our next claim is that solutions of this form are dense in i: For this, fix a countable dense subset
 {T1, T2,... } of S. Let f be a fixed solution and define the solution
 n = (T1,,..., Tn;f(T1),...f(Tn)
 Observe that by construction, Pf(1T) =f(TI), i = 1,.. ., n.
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 12 K. C. BORDER AND U. SEGAL
 LEMMA 3: For each f Et, P,[f f uniformly on S.
 n
 PROOF: Since f is continuous and W is compact, f is uniformly continuous on S. Therefore for
 each 8 > 0, there is some 5(e) > 0 such that p(S, T) < 8(e) implies Ilf(S) -f(T)II < .
 To simplify notation, suppress the f and just write Pn. Now let e > 0 be given. Set
 12K '(3 -
 Choose No large enough so that for n 2 No, for every T E .-', there is some Ti E {T1,..., 7n} with
 p(T, T1) < (i/2). (This can be done since {T1, T2, . . . } is dense.) Choose N1 large enough so that for
 n ? N1, (n/2n)x/2K <(8/3), and set N = max(NO, Nl}. Choose an arbitrary S eW. Then recalling
 that E,= 1Aq = 1, we get
 If(S) - cPn(S) ||
 n
 = f(S) - E A7( p(S, T1). p(S, ,Tif(T)(S)
 n
 = E A~(p(S, T1),..., p(S,T7))(f(S) -P
 n
 (2) < Ai( p(S,T1),..., p(S,Tn))Ilf(S)-(P
 i=l1
 Now
 (3) hf(S) - (PT"f(T (s) 11 < 1? f(S) -f(Ti)I + 1 f(Ti) - TI,fjT)
 So break up the sum in (2) into two parts. Let A = {i: p(S, T1) < ij} and B =Ac. Then for i eA,
 inequality (3) implies
 8 3 I1f(S) -'TI,ftT1)(S)" ?l < + .
 This is because the first term on the right-hand side of (3) is less than or equal to 8/3 by the
 definition of a(s), and the second term comes from Lemma 1. Also observe that there is some
 i* EA with p(S, Ti*) < (G/2). Regarding the terms in B, since S E W is bounded above by (K, K),
 the distance If(S) - (PT (T,)(S)II is bounded above by V2K, which is independent of S. Then using
 the definition of An in (2), we have
 1f(S) - 'pn(S)I|
 n
 < , Aq( p(S, T1),..., p(S, T;))II f(S) -(PTJ(T,)(S)
 i=l1
 EiEP(S 1) (_+e ) + P(S K
 ?1
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 ( s e \ n-n
 < - +- 1+ -nC y5K
 3 3 J 7lp(S, T1 )
 -n J-n
 <- + - + - Vn CK 2
 < - + _ + _
 3 3 3
 for n > N. Thus On converges uniformly to f. Q.E.D.
 We next define an ordering -n on T1 x T2 ... X Tn, where T1,..., Tn are the first n elements of
 the fixed dense set {T1, T2,. .}. , by
 X Sfn Y 'PT ...., T,,; x >- (PTi,..., T,,; y-
 It follows from Lemma 2 that the relation -n on T1 x T2 ... X Tn is a monotonic convex continuous
 quasiorder, and satisfies mixture symmetry.
 In the sequel we say that the function W of n variables is quadratic if it is of the form
 n n n
 W(x1 . xn) = E E aijxixj + X, bixi + c.
 i=1 j=1 i=1
 LEMMA 4: The preference s,n is represented by a utility function of the form
 n n
 Vn(x) =E E(Xi1Xj2)Pij,
 i=1 j=1
 where p _ 0 and En j= 1 Pij= 1.
 PROOF: We use Fact 1, and rule out areas B and C by showing that the coordinate axes are
 indifference sets, which is compatible only with a quasiconcave quadratic representation. Let
 xi E T1 x T2 ... X Tn satisfy xm2 = O for all m = 1. n, xmI = O for all m i, and x, = max{x: x
 E 1} 2 K> 0. It follows that 'TT x'(S)2 = 0 for all S. So by condition DI, 'PT X' - (PT, which
 implies that the il-axis is a n-indifference set. This shows that every axis is an indifference set,
 which rules out the regions B and C.
 Thus tn has a representation of the form
 n n 2 2 n 2
 (4) Jn(X) = E E E E (XikXIl)PikIl + E E Xikbik,
 i=1 j=1 k=1 1=1 i=1 k=1
 where p satisfies p > 0 (because of monotonicity) and EiEjEkElPikjl = 1. (The sum cannot be zero,
 since Vn is not linear.) We now show that the bik terms in the representation in equation (4) are
 zero. Let x' be as above. Then by condition DI, PT xl o, so Vn(x') = 0, for all values of x,.
 This implies pili, = bi1 = 0. Similar arguments show that each Pjkjk = bjk = 0.
 Next we show that if i =Aj and k = 1, then Pikj - Let xi E T1 x T2 * x satisfy xJ2 =0 for
 all =s1, , n, Xmi- =O for m i{i, j}, x'j =max{x1 : xE Tm} for m E {i, j}. Again (PT x I(S)2 = 0 for
 all S, so as above Vn(xUj) = 0, which implies piljl = 0. Similarly each PA2j2 = 0. Q.E.D.
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 14 K. C. BORDER AND U. SEGAL
 This construction defines a discrete probability measure ir, on &?Xg? by v,({(T,7Tj)1)=pi, for
 each (i, j). This measure has the property that
 Vn(x) = f 11(S)f2(T)drn(S,T) wheneverfk(Ti) =Xik
 for i =1. n and k = 1, 2. So abuse notation slightly and define VJ': R by
 V'(f) xf/,1(S)f2(T) dwn(S, T)
 and note that Vn(f)= V,(OPf). This means that
 Vn(f) 2 Vn(g) (f(T1),. ..,f(M)) ,n(g(T1)d., g(T,)).
 Since V is compact, the set of probability measures on ' x V is compact (in the topology of weak
 convergence of measures, see Theorem 12.10 in Aliprantis and Border (1994)), so there is a
 subsequence of iTr? converging to a limit ir, which is also a probability measure on .' X '. Define
 V(f) = fJ1g,(S)f2(T) drr(S, T).
 Note that if fm Tf uniformly, then Jfmfm2 dirn -I fif2 dwr (see Corollary 12.6 in Aliprantis and
 Border (1994)). That is, Vn(fm) V(f). In particular, Vn (P,f) V (f).
 LEMMA 5: If f -g, then V(f) 2 V(g). In particular, f-g implies V(f) = V(g).
 PROOF: First suppose f >- g. Since 0,,f --f and (g - g, for large enough n we have P,)f >- 'ng, so
 VJ<1@P>)> Vn(P,9). Therefore V(f) > V(g). By continuity of V and a, we have fag implies
 V(f) > (g). Q.E.D.
 LEMMA 6: The limit measure 7T is supported by the diagonal A = {(S, S): S E -'} of VX S.
 PROOF: Let G x H cVx be an open region with A n (G x H) = 0 and fr(G x H) > 0. Note
 that this implies that G n H= 0. Pick (S, T) E G x H. Let A: V R be a continuous function
 satisfying A(S) = 1, 1 > A(U) > 0 for all U E G with U =A S and A(U) =0 for all U E Gc. Similarly let
 a: V R be a continuous function satisfying a!(T) = 1, 1 > a(U) > 0 for all U E H with U =# T and
 a(U) =0 for all U E HC. Let h be the solution that gives everything to 1, that is h (U) = max{x1:
 x E U} and h2(S) = 0 for all S. Similarly let g give everything to 2. Set f(U) = A(U)h(U) + a(U)g(U).
 Then f is a continuous solution with ((S, T): f1(S)f2(T) > 0} = G x H. But by condition DI, f 0, so
 by Lemma 5, V(f ) = V(0) = 0. Thus 7r(G x H) = 0. This implies ir(A) = 1. Q.E.D.
 Set g(G) = 7r(G x G) for every Borel subset G of S. Then clearly
 V(f) = fJ1(S)f2(S) du(S).
 LEMMA 7: The measure u has full support.
 PROOF: Let G be an open subset of S?. Let N denote the Nash bargaining solution (any positive
 solution will do), and let A: G -- Ra be a continuous function satisfying 1 2 A(S) > 0 for S E G and
 A(S) = 0 for S E GC. Let g be the solution defined by g(S) = A(S)N(S). Then by monotonicity,
 g >- 0. Thus for some e > 0 small enough the solution f with fk(S) = e < K, k = 1, 2, is a solution on
 ,V satisfying g > f. Therefore by Lemma 5, V(g) 2 V(f ). Now VJ(f) V(f), and Vn(f) = s2 for all
 n, so V(g) 2 82 > 0, which implies ,u(G) > 0. Thus , has full support. Q.E.D.
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 We can now finally prove Theorem 1.
 PROOF OF THEOREM 1: We already know that f -g implies V(f) 2 V(g). It only remains to show
 that f>- g implies V(f) > V(g). Now if ft>- g, it follows by condition DI that fi(S)f2(S) > 0 for some
 S. (Otherwise f 0.) Also, for some 1 > a ? 0, we have of g. But since , has full support, we get
 V(f) > V(af) 2 V(g), so V(f) > V(g). Q.E.D.
 APPENDIX B: PROOF OF LEMMA 1
 We start with some simple facts.
 FAcr 2: If aT(S) < 1, then aT(S n T) = aT(S).
 FACr 3: p(S n T, T) < p(S, T).
 PROOF: We have to show that for x E T, d(x, S n T) < d(x, S). Let x E T\S and y E S such that
 d(x, S) = d(x, y). If y E S n T, then d(x, S n T) = d(x, S). Suppose y E S \ T. Then since S is
 disposable, and by the triangle inequality, d(x, S) < d(x, y), a contradiction. Q.E.D.
 We now turn to the proof of the Lemma 1. We break the analysis into cases. For each of these
 cases we show that equation (1) is satisfied.
 CASE 1: We consider first games S and T with aT(S) < 1. Let x* e T be such that lix -
 TjX(S)|| = (1 - aT(S))IIXII is maximized over T at x*. Note that x* EC argmaxx E Tllxll and that x*
 is on the boundary of T. We shall replace S and T by sets S* and T* satisfying the following three
 requirements.
 1. x* E T*.
 2. aT*(S*) = aT(S).
 3. p(S*, T*) < p(S, T).
 To simplify notation, replace aT(S) by simply a. Also, for x, y E R2 , let l(x, y) denote the line
 through these two points. The slope of a line H is denoted c-(H).
 By Facts 2 and 3, the three requirements are satisfied if T* = T and S* = S n T. We can thus
 assume that S c T. By the definition of aT(S), there is a point y E T such that ay is on the outer
 boundary of S. Of course, y is on the boundary of T. Assume without loss of generality that Y1 <x4*
 and Y2 2X2.*
 Let H be a supporting line to S at ay. Denote the area bounded by H and the two axes by S1,
 and let S2 = T n S,. Note that aT(S2) = a, but p(S2, T) < p(S, T).
 Let T* be the minimal convex disposable set containing y, x*, and (K, K), and let S* = S2 n T*.
 Clearly, aT*(S*) = a, but p(S*, T*) < p(S, T). Observe that for all x on the boundary of T*,
 d(x, S*) < d(y, S*). This is because ax* c S*, hence o-(H) 2 o(l(y, x*)). On the other hand, the
 boundary of T* to the left of y is either the horizontal segment A = [(0, Y2), Y] (Y2 2 K), or it is the
 two segments B = [(0, K), (K, K)] and C = [(K, K), y]. In the first case, no point in A can be further
 away from H than y. In the second case, since (K, K) E S*, it follows that B c S*, and since
 o(H) < o-(l((K, K), a y)), it follows that y = argmax x c d(x, H). We thus obtain
 (5) p(S*,T*)=d(y,S*).
 There are now four subcases.
 SUBCASE LA: Suppose first that o-(H) < -1 and Yi > K. Now o-(l(y, x*)) < o-(H) < -1, so
 given that x * E arg max x T*IIxII it follows that y lies in the region bounded by the quarter circle of
 radius IIx* 11 and the line of slope -1 through x*. This line intersects this arc in exactly two places:
 x* and its transpose (x*, x* ) (which may coincide, in which case x* = x* and y = x* ). In particular,
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 4?* * and since y lies to the right of the transpose (x4*,4x*), we have Yi I4x*. It also follows that d(y, S*) > (1 - a)y1, so by equation (5) we have (1 - a)y1 < p(S*, T*). Using Yi 2 K, and these
 other facts we get
 IX* - (PT, X* (S)II = (1 - a)llx* I|
 <(1- a)ll(K, x*)I11
 < (1- a)II(yl,K)II
 < 1(1, K/yl) IIp(S*, T*)
 < 1(1, K/K) IlIp(S*, T*)
 K
 K
 SUBCASE 1.B: Suppose now that o(H) < -1 and yl <K. Since y is on the boundary of T*,
 Y2 2 K. Observe that JIx*II 2 Ilyll. Let s2 =4x*2 +x*2 = 11x112 and obtain
 1 2~~~~~~~~
 u(H) 2 o(l(y,x*)) 2 u(l(s/v;2,s/sli),(s,O)) =-
 Let H* be the line through cay with slope - 1/(xi - 1). Then, since o-(H) < -1,
 d(y,S*)d(y, H*) = (1-)(Y1 + (C21)Y2)
 V14 - 2C2;
 (1 - a)(V2-1)K
 I4 - 2V2
 In this calculation, we use the fact that the distance between the line Ax1 + Bx2 + C =0 and the
 point (x?, x 0) is
 (6) l(Axo + Bxo + C)
 FA 2+ B 2
 Now
 IIX* - (PT, X*(S)II = (1 - a)llx* 1
 < (1 - a)v2K
 < KV 4-2V2 p(S, T)
 (Vr2- 1)K
 K
 < 4-p(S, T).
 K
 The last inequality follows from
 V '7 4-2S5 = v(2 + 1) C4 - 2x5
 (v/'2 - 1)
 = VF + 2< 4.
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 SUBCASE L.C: Suppose now that o(H) 2 -1 and Y2 2 K. Since o(H) > - 1, we have d(y, S*) 2
 (1 - a)Y2. Since Y2 2 K, we have
 X* - ( ,*(S)I = (1 - a)IIx*II
 < (1 - a)II(K,Y2)
 < p(S*, T )1(K/Y2, 1)11
 < p(S*, T*)II(K/K, 1)11
 K
 < vi-p(S,T).
 K
 SUBCASE LD: The remaining case is o-(H) 2 -1 and Y2 < K. Let H* = 1((K, K), ay). Since
 (K, K) E S*, o(H*) 2 o(H). Therefore, p(S, T) 2 d(y, S*) 2 d(y, H) 2 d(y, H*). Note that H* is
 given by -(aY2 - K)X1 + (ay1- K)X2 - aK(y1 -Y2) =0. Therefore, by using equation (6), we
 obtain
 p(S, T) d(y, H*) = (1- a)K(y1 -Y2)
 V(-ay1 -K) +(aY2-K)2
 Hence
 (7) IIx* - PT, X* (S)II = (1 - )IIx* ||
 < (1-a)C2K
 V(ay 1-K ) + (aY2-K)_2/K
 K(Y1 -Y2)
 Since ay is on the boundary of S, it follows that a 2 K/yl. Also, by assumption, a < 1. Since
 h(a) := (ay1 - K)2 + (aY2 - K)2 is a convex function of a, it follows that for a E= K/y1, 1],
 h(a) < max{h(K/yl), h(l)}. For a = K/y1, we obtain
 (Yi -K PC + (-Y2- K)
 =1<!
 K(y1 -Y2) Yl K
 Now let a = 1. Since Yi 2 K and Y2 < a, we obtain for y $ (K, K) that
 (y1 -K)2 + (Y2- K)2 1
 K(y1 -Y2) K
 Thus inequality (7) becomes
 'PT,X*(S)II < (ay1 - K)2 + (aY2 - K)2
 K
 < Z-p(S, T).
 K
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 18 K. C. BORDER AND U. SEGAL
 Finally, if y = (K, K), then since ay is on the boundary of S, a = 1, and the lemma is trivially
 true.
 CASE 2: The analysis of the case aT(S) > 1 is similar, only we replace T with S*, and S with T*.
 Q.E.D.
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